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Abstract Enactivist approaches claim that cognition arises through a dynamic in-
teraction between an acting organism and its environment. An ongoing challenge for 
these approaches is the problem of accounting for normativity while avoiding overly 
reductionist outcomes. This article examines a few proposed solutions, including agent-
environment dynamics, participatory sense-making, radical enactivism, the skilful inten-
tionality framework, and enactivist cultural psychology. It argues that good examples 
of enacted normativity are gestures of appreciation/disapproval performed in the aes-
thetic domain. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey explore this issue and their ideas could be 
productively worked upon in an enactive account.
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1 Introduction
Embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended approaches to cogni-
tion (4E Cognition approaches) aim to account for the mind in a nat-
uralistic framework, privileging an anti-dualist and often anti-rep-
resentationalist perspective that takes the mind to be an aspect or a 
part of an organism – a body – and the organism to be crucially en-
trenched in an environment. In this kind of framework, the interac-
tions between the organism and the environment, and the interac-
tions between different organisms, play a fundamental role in the 
development of cognition. To perceive is not merely to receive bits 
of information, and to know is not simply the result of performing 
some mental computation on the basis of that information, assem-
bling mental representations of the external world. Rather, perceiv-
ing and knowing are activities enacted by living organisms in their 
environments in a continuous flux of movement, reciprocal adapta-
tion and change. While different authors are variously committed to 
defending one or more of the four E’s, certain basic tenets are gen-
erally shared by these approaches, most notably an anti-Cartesian 
attitude that resists the traditional picture of the mind as separated 
from (and superior to) the body.
In this paper, I will focus in particular on enactive approaches, 
by which I mean a variety of perspectives originating from Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch’s seminal The Embodied Mind (1991), but al-
so taking inspiration from and developing the notion of affordances 
as proposed by the ecological psychology of James J. Gibson (1979).1 
In recent years, enactivists have attempted to extend their scope: 
while they originally focused on basic cognitive activities and in-
teractions, now they offer wide-ranging accounts of more articulat-
ed, complex, and ‘high-level’ cognition,2 involving not only natural 
coping and elementary social skills but also abstract reasoning, lan-
guage, responsiveness to norms and values, complex social practic-
es, and, ultimately, culture itself. This extension can assume various 
shapes, both in diachronic and in synchronic terms. Diachronically, 
an enactivist approach can help understand the evolution of cogni-
tion from basic animal forms of life to the later stages of humankind 
(phylogenesis); or the development of high-level cognition in the hu-
man child (ontogenesis). Synchronically, an enactivist analysis of ba-
sic and high-level cognition can show how the two are interrelated, 
and this again can be done from different points of view and with dif-
1 For the sake of brevity, I assume the reader’s familiarity with the basics of these 
approaches.
2 Although I believe it is not the most felicitous, I am using the expression ‘high-lev-
el’ because it is widely employed in the literature.
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ferent methods. There is also a methodological issue involved here. 
While a scientific approach might look for causal explanation, a phil-
osophical one might aim towards conceptual clarifications (cf. Glock 
2018). This paper is a philosophical analysis of some conceptual diffi-
culties and impasse that enactivist approaches face in their attempt 
to enlarge the scope of their accounts to high-level cognition. More 
specifically, I will direct the attention to enactivist accounts of nor-
mativity, by which I mean all those phenomena of human life that in-
volve norms and/or values, and therefore the distinction between 
right and wrong, correct and incorrect, especially from the point 
of view of ethics and aesthetics. This is admittedly a broad notion, 
whose meaning will become clearer as the argument proceeds. The 
challenge that enactivism faces in tackling normativity, as I see it, is 
the challenge of explaining it without explaining it away. Is it possi-
ble to offer a naturalistic but non-reductionist account of these phe-
nomena, one that allows for understanding them better without re-
ducing them to something non-normative?
In tackling this question, I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I 
will present some enactivist attempts of making sense of normativi-
ty – namely, agent-environment dynamics, participatory sense-mak-
ing, and radical enactivism – and some criticisms that have been lev-
elled against them. In section 3, I will move to other proposals within 
the enactivist family – situated normativity, skilful intentionality, and 
enactive cultural psychology – that are not subject to the same criti-
cism. One of these proposals finds inspiration in some Wittgenstein-
ian remarks on ‘aesthetic reactions’ and on gestures; in section 4, 
I will linger on these aspects, focusing on what I will call ‘aesthetic 
gestures’ as a good example of enactive normativity. This will allow 
for a deeper examination of the notion of normativity. In section 5, I 
will claim that the pragmatist tradition has good resources for devel-
oping this insight, focusing on G.H. Mead’s analysis of gestures and 
on John Dewey’s concept of ‘qualitative thought’. I will conclude that 
a non-reductionist enactive account of normativity is possible under 
certain conditions and that aesthetic gestures are a promising ob-
ject of investigation for it.
2 Agent-Environment Dynamics, Sense-Making, 
and Radical Enactivism
Anthony Chemero proposed a “radical embodied cognitive science” 
(2009) that completely does away with representation and computa-
tion; by appealing to the pragmatist/naturalist tradition of William 
James and John Dewey, as well as to Gibson’s ecological psycholo-
gy, it describes cognition in terms of agent-environment dynamics. 
There is a passage in Chemero’s book that is particularly interesting 
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for our purposes. In order to understand it we need to take a step 
back and first have a look at the perspective that Chemero is arguing 
against: Mark Rowlands’ theory of “representation in action” (2006). 
With the aim of explaining representation through action (which he 
sees as a variant of Wittgenstein’s problem of explaining rule follow-
ing through practices), Rowlands describes actions in terms of nor-
mative claims on ‘tryings’: an action of the type f-ing is such if an in-
tentional state of the kind ‘trying to f’ precedes it. “The identity of 
an action”, he claims, “depends on what should cause it, not on what 
merely does cause it” (2006, 61), and therefore a merely causal the-
ory of action fails to accommodate its normative dimension. In order 
to account for this normative dimension, Rowlands proposes his The-
sis of Representation in Action: some actions, that he calls deeds, are 
themselves representational and normative and there is no need to ap-
peal to other representational or normative elements to explain them.
According to Chemero, instead, it is possible to account for the 
normativity in human perception and action, solving Rowlands’ al-
leged problem, without appealing to this representational aspect. 
This is because affordances are themselves normative; indeed, they 
are only comprehensible “in terms of norm-laden abilities” (2006, 
146 fn. 9).3 In other words, an individual with an ability is supposed 
to behave in a particular way and may fail to do so. Differently from 
dispositions, that according to Chemero inevitably become manifest 
whenever coupled with the right enabling conditions,4 abilities are 
normative. In explaining this point, Chemero affirms:
A better way to understand abilities is as functions. Functions de-
pend on an individual animal’s developmental history or the evo-
lutionary history of the species, both of which occur in the con-
text of the environment. […] Abilities come to play the role they 
do in the behavioural economy of the animal because, at some 
point in the past, they helped the animal (or its ancestor) to sur-
vive, reproduce, or flourish in its environment. Yet even in identi-
cal circumstances to those in which they were helpful in the past, 
abilities can fail to become manifest; there can, that is, be a mal-
function. (2009, 145)
I am not sure that talk of abilities as functions, and of affordances as 
normative relations in virtue of that, is very helpful in solving the is-
3 Chemero is also reinterpreting Gibson’s notion of affordances here. Originally de-
fined as properties of the object that show possibilities of actions for a user, in Cheme-
ro’s view they are relationships between the perceiver and the object (or the environ-
ment more generally).
4 For a different, Wittgenstein-inspired account of dispositions, see Morelli 2020.
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sue of normativity (I am not concerned here with the issue of repre-
sentation). There is indeed a big difference between the binary suc-
cess/failure, which seems appropriate for the notion of functions, and 
the binary correct/incorrect, which pertains to normativity (Heras-
Escribano 2019, 92-3). A further problem with the concept of a func-
tion is that understanding something, such as an ability, as a func-
tion, depends on knowing what it is a function for. Indeed, a machine, 
typically, functions (or not), it works (or not), but it is not the machine 
itself, be it taken in isolation or together with its environment, that 
functions or not; it is us, an interpreter, that can see it as function-
ing or not (Boncompagni 2018a, 80; cf. Heras-Escribano 2019, 94-
5). Similarly, affordances per se lack the criteria of correctness that 
would allow characterizing them as normative. It is the interpreter 
that enables such a characterization, by noticing what is the ‘func-
tioning’ or correct way of interacting with them. It might be objected 
that the difference between an organism and a machine is precise-
ly that the organism has its own survival as a sort of intrinsic goal. 
This is indeed a central idea in the autopoietic-enactive approach. 
Yet, talking of ‘goals’ and ‘norms’ here amounts to applying a mis-
leading picture. This vocabulary belongs to another context, and it 
risks suggesting a host of other implications that are only appropri-
ate of that other context.
Another way of putting the same point is by highlighting that 
Chemero’s approach does not respond to Wittgenstein’s argument 
against private language (Heras-Escribano, de Pinedo 2016; Heras-
Escribano 2019, 93, 101-2). An action, in order to be characterized 
as normative, must not only satisfy a goal but also be performed un-
der certain correctness criteria regarding the right way to satis-
fy such goal. Correctness criteria are crucially public or shared: an 
agent cannot distinguish between ‘it is right’ and ‘it seems right to 
me’ without appealing to public criteria (Wittgenstein 2009, 185-242).
This same criticism has been levelled against enactive approach-
es that focus on sense-making. Building on the original autopoietic-
enactive theory proposed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), Di 
Paolo (2005) adds one element to the picture: adaptivity, defined as 
a system’s capacity to regulate its states and its relation to the en-
vironment so as to respond appropriately to external perturbations, 
avoid risky situations, and seek preferable ones. Adaptivity goes be-
yond the basic ‘norm’ of keeping a unity going (autopoiesis), because 
it also accounts for an organism’s preferring and seeking certain sit-
uations rather than others:
Bacteria possessing this capability will be able to generate a nor-
mativity within their current set of viability conditions and for 
themselves. They will be capable of appreciating not just sugar 
as nutritive, but the direction where the concentration grows as 
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useful, and swimming in that direction as the right thing to do in 
some circumstances. (Di Paolo 2005, 437)
In other words, the organism is able to evaluate its present situation 
with respect to an external element that has a positive or negative 
valence for it (‘self-monitoring’), and to act appropriately, in the way 
it should act (‘appropriate regulation’). Adaptivity, according to Di 
Paolo, implies a form of normativity in the organisms that possess it, 
and that is why it can account for disfunctions and pathologies (2005, 
440), as well as for sense-making. The organism enactively makes 
sense of elements of its surroundings in that it uncovers and at the 
same time constructs the meaning they have for it.
Expanding on this view, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) propose a 
theory of participatory sense making as an enactive approach to so-
cial cognition. When two (or more) individuals coordinate their move-
ments and utterances, a “regulated coupling” emerges, a new organi-
zation, that is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself, without thereby 
destroying the individuals (2007, 493). In this context, sense-making 
gets social: new domains of sense become available, that were not 
there for individuals alone. A further step in this line of research is 
the enactive investigation of language in Di Paolo, Cuffari, De Jaegh-
er (2018), in which it becomes clearer that there are different levels 
of normativity involved in the enactive approach, especially when it 
extends to the social and cultural domains. The first two levels were 
already described in Di Paolo (2005): the basic biological normativ-
ity of the organism as an autonomous unity, and the normativity in-
volved in adaptivity and sense-making. A third level is the norma-
tivity of social interactions, where the coupling between individuals 
has its own rules. Finally, there is the normativity of the habitus, that 
reflects sociocultural practices and language. An important aspect 
that the authors underline is that what is ‘given’ in human action and 
experience is “the group and community life of historical transfor-
mation of the lifeworld, with its norms, rules, institutions and rela-
tions” (Di Paolo, Cuffari, De Jaegher 2018, 136), and that this com-
posite ‘given’ includes language (or ‘languaging’, as they put it) as a 
constitutive ingredient.5
Now, what looks still a bit problematic in this approach is not the 
use of normative categories for social interactions, culture, the hab-
itus, or linguistic practices; rather, one could raise doubts concern-
ing the employment of words and concepts related to normativity and 
meaning at the level of elementary organisms’ adaptivity and sense-
making. As Heras-Escribano, Noble and de Pinedo have underlined, 
“when we say that an agent (for instance, a bacterium) is searching, 
5 On language see also van den Herik 2020.
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avoiding, intending or wanting we are not describing the agent, but 
interpreting, making sense of its behaviour” (2015, 26).6 The ‘mak-
ing-sense’ part is ours, the interpreters’. In other words, the risk in 
this approach is that it might suggest that ‘high-level’ normativity is 
based on, and therefore can be explained by reference to, ‘low-lev-
el’ normativity.
Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017), with their proposal of Radical En-
activist Cognition, use similar arguments to criticize what they call 
AAE (Autopoietic Adaptive Enactivism), that includes the above-men-
tioned perspectives based on sense-making. Radical enactivism de-
fends a strong version of anti-representationalism and claims that the 
basic forms of experience and response to the environment are non-
conceptual and contentless. In Hutto and Myin’s view, the kind of in-
tentionality that characterizes basic minds, including some forms of 
human cognition, is ‘target-focused’, but does not involve or require 
content; they call it ‘ur-intentionality’. Ur-intentionality, or intention-
al directedness, has a basic normative dimension, in their view, but 
only in the sense that natural attunements between the organism and 
its environments that developed in the past structure the organism’s 
current tendencies for response and “normatively fix what is inten-
tionally targeted” (Hutto, Myin 2017, 116-17). Perspectives focused on 
sense-making are wrong, according to radical enactivists, in talking 
of meaning at the level of the organisms’ adaptivity to the environ-
ment. It is only at a later stage and, as it happens, only in the human 
lineage, that special forms of sociocultural practices emerge. Only 
minds who have mastered these sociocultural practices can engage 
in content-involving cognition, and between these two stages – con-
tentless and content-involving minds – there is a difference in kind, 
not just degree (Hutto, Myin 2017, 134).
While avoiding the vocabulary of meaning for basic minds, how-
ever, Hutto and Myin face another problem: they tend to posit a big 
divide between low-level and high-level cognition (Dreon 2019a). Al-
though their recent book (2017) is explicitly aimed at somewhat bridg-
ing this gap, the insistence on basic cognition (including human basic 
cognition) being not only non-representational but also contentless 
risks overlooking how deeply even basic activities like perception it-
self and spontaneous reactions, in the human context, are imbued 
with culture and normativity.
6 Colombetti (2014) too seems to be committed to this vocabulary. For a response 
to Heras-Escribano, Noble and de Pinedo, see Di Paolo, Cuffari, De Jaegher (2018, 34).
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3 Situated Normativity, Skilful Intentionality, 
and Enactive Cultural Psychology
Other approaches within the enactivist/ecological family take a dif-
ferent road. We might say that instead of naturalizing the norma-
tive, they tend to culturalize the natural – yet, crucially, not in the 
sense that they (mis)apply normative concepts to basic forms of life; 
rather, they detect normativity in the natural, instinctive and unre-
flective actions and reactions that are typical of the human (or in any 
case of complex) form(s) of life. Instead of claiming that the norma-
tive is natural, they claim that the natural is, for humans, normative.
Erik Rietveld starts from the realization of how “amazing” it is that 
“even without explicit deliberation we normally act in ways that are 
appropriate from the point of view of sociocultural practice” (2008, 
973). There are numberless episodes in which individuals act without 
reflection, and among those episodes are not only automatic move-
ments triggered by physical stimuli, but also expressions and reac-
tions that are significantly linked to skills and expertise. Rietveld 
makes use of the Wittgensteinian notion of “directed discontent” 
(Klaassen, Rietveld, Topal 2010): the fast, instinctive and at the same 
time evaluative reaction of appreciation or disapproval that charac-
terizes the relationship between an artisan and its work (typically 
an object), manifested in one’s bodily postures, gestures, and facial 
expressions. The object in this context represents an affordance, or 
better a social or a cultural affordance.7 Directed discontent is an 
example of situated normativity: it depends on a complex sociocul-
tural background going all the way down to bodily movements. It is 
at the same time immediate and normative, lived (bodily) and cul-
tural (communal). Its normativity is grounded in the human form of 
life, in a multifarious and relatively stable set of ways of living, so-
ciocultural practices, shared background assumptions, values, hab-
its and customs that show common patterns as well as geographical 
and historical variations. Directed discontent and aesthetic reactions 
in general are only understandable against the background of these 
regular ways of doing.
Elaborating on this and drawing from ecological psychology and 
ethnography, Rietveld, Denys and Van Wester have developed the 
Skilled Intentionality Framework, where skilled intentionality is de-
fined as “the selective engagement with multiple affordances simul-
taneously in a concrete situation” (Rietveld, Denys, Van Wester 2018, 
41), and an affordance is defined as “a relation between (a) an aspect 
of the (sociomaterial) environment and (b) an ability available in a 
7 See Costall 1995, 2012; Solymosi 2013; Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014; Ramstead, Veis-
sière, Kirmayer 2016; Carvalho 2020.
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‘form of life’” (45). This perspective takes fully into account the fact 
that human beings respond to both material affordances and social 
opportunities for engagement, and the two are inextricably intercon-
nected. Whether a bottle of water solicits me to grab it and drink the 
water or not does not depend only on material and biological aspects, 
including my thirst, but also on human social norms, such as owner-
ship for instance (Costall 1995, 473). In this view, the material and 
social sides of affordances are constitutively entangled (there can-
not be the material without the social, or the social without the ma-
terial). The human eco-niche is “sociomaterial” through and through 
(van Dijk, Rietveld 2017, 2): human beings show a selective openness 
to affordances that is “appropriate with respect to a socio-cultural 
practice or form of life” (Bruineberg, Chemero, Rietveld 2019, 5234).
A similar outlook is adopted in enactivist cultural psychology:
A radically cultural enactivism requires more than an account of 
human experience that builds up from biological autonomy to soci-
ety and culture. It requires us to acknowledge the irreducible nor-
mativity of everyday life and of even our most personal actions and 
expressions. For humans, to perceive and to act is to perceive and 
to act in a way that always remains sensitive to normative (hence 
social) correction. (Baerveldt, Verheggen 2012, 168)
Cultural enactivism avoids both deriving normativity from a biolog-
ical intentionality or natural teleology and describing it in terms of 
the internalization of cultural models or representations. Our social-
ization in a cultural environment instead is thought of as involving 
“a historical process of continuous attunement to consensually or-
chestrated community practices” (Baerveldt, Verheggen 2012, 179), 
where training and learning techniques (as opposed to rules) assume 
a fundamental role. Baerveldt and Verheggen also build on Wittgen-
stein’s notion of a form of life, describing it as “a total style of being” 
(2012, 183); they also talk of cultural competence as “a stylization 
of a total way of life” (184) and of normative dispositions as “expres-
sive skills and styles” (185). The notion of style that is adumbrated 
here helps illuminate how culture has local and personal interpre-
tations – that is, different ways of being enacted – where the very 
possibility of embodying and expressing a style relies on having ac-
quired a competence or a mastery through training and corrections 
(cf. Milkov 2020, 511).
In sum, situated normativity, the skilled intentionality framework, 
and enactive cultural psychology all point towards an idea of norma-
tivity in the human form of life as embodied, enacted, and yet irre-
ducible. Human life is normative from the start and all the way down: 
normativity shapes the everyday. Perception itself from this point of 
view is sensitive to the normative, as demonstrated by “socially de-
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pendent perceptions” (Arango 2019). These are differences in per-
ception shown by members of different social groups. For instance, 
patterns of eye movement differ in people from America and from Chi-
na when confronted with a scene in which a background and a focal 
object can be distinguished. The point is that we learn to perceive, 
and socially dependent perceptions show “the enactment of cultur-
ally structured, normatively rich techniques of interaction with mul-
ti- and inter-modal perceptible materials” (Arango 2019, 39). There 
are cultural styles of seeing that frame what is to be considered sa-
lient in a scene, as well as what is and what is not an agreeable and 
harmonious relation between different colours, surfaces, or patterns. 
What we encounter here is the connection between perception and 
aesthetics. On this terrain, the intrinsically normative and evalua-
tive aspect of the human form of life comes to the fore.
4 Aesthetic Gestures
Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life plays a relevant role in the per-
spectives just examined. I would like now to expand a bit on this leg-
acy by focusing on Wittgenstein’s remarks on gestures, and on ‘aes-
thetic gestures’ in particular.
The importance of gestures in Wittgenstein’s philosophy can hard-
ly be overestimated. An often-told story even suggests that a specific 
gesture had a fundamental part in the shift from his early to his lat-
er thought. According to the anecdote, Wittgenstein was travelling 
with the Italian economist Piero Sraffa, and presumably explaining 
his views, when the latter made a Neapolitan gesture “brushing the 
underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the finger-tips of 
one hand” (Malcolm 2001, 58; Engelmann 2013, 152) – a sign mean-
ing something like ‘I don’t care’ – and asked Wittgenstein what was 
the grammar of that. Although Wittgenstein does not offer specific 
clues regarding the significance of this episode, remarks about ges-
tures in general abound in his writings.
Wittgenstein’s interest does not lie in gestures as the external ex-
pression of an internal idea or state of mind (though he does talk of 
gestures in the context of expression), or on representational ges-
tures, i.e. bodily movements that tend to reproduce something (Ali-
bali, Boncoddo, Hostetter 2014). One of the themes around which his 
remarks tend to cluster is pointing, a context in which gestures are 
often connected with language. In his view, however, although point-
ing gestures are used in language acquisition, considering gestures 
as ‘prototypes’ of language is misleading, because it oversimplifies 
both gestures and language (Wittgenstein 2005, 23-25; Wittgenstein 
2009, §§ 1-3). One reason why is that even in this alleged elementary 
form, the meaning is not fixed by the gesture. In order to understand 
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a pointing gesture, we already need to know what we are supposed 
to focus on, which aspect of the object or scene the gesture points 
to. If I say ‘XYZ’ pointing towards a wooden black table, my interloc-
utor might interpret the word ‘XYZ’ accompanied by my gesture as 
referring to the table as an object, to the material (wood), or to the 
colour (black), or to other aspects (e.g. solidity, the shape of the ta-
ble, my desire to have dinner etc.). This is another way of saying that 
a gesture is only a gesture if it is embedded in a normative context 
that clarifies how it is to be interpreted. In other words, it is true that 
“our language-game is an extension of primitive behavior”, for “our 
language-game is behavior”, or “instinct” (Wittgenstein 1981, §545),8 
but at the same time it is true that “a gesture doesn’t have to be in-
nate; it is instilled, and yet assimilated” (Wittgenstein 1982, §712). 
This is clear if we think of gestures belonging to cultures different 
than ours. “We [Europeans] don’t understand Chinese gestures any 
better than Chinese sentences” (Wittgenstein 2005, 8; Wittgenstein 
1981, §219), Wittgenstein observes, and we need to learn these ges-
tures, either by being told what they mean in words, or just by grow-
ing up or being trained in that culture. Gesture is natural and cul-
tural at the very same time.
To clarify, this is not to deny that pointing might have a special 
role in language acquisition or in the development of joint attention, 
or that it is so natural that even some non-human animals can un-
derstand it (Kita 2003). Rather, these considerations help broaden 
the perspective from the pointing gesture to gestures more general-
ly and help see how much the naturality of gestures is already a cul-
tural or normative naturality. Gestures in the aesthetic domain fur-
ther illustrate the point.
Recall Rietveld’s talk of aesthetic reactions: these are immediate 
and evaluative reactions of appraisal or disapproval, where the eval-
uative moment is not merely on a pleasure vs. disgust axis, but on 
the axis of aesthetic value.
You design a door and look at it and say: “Higher, higher, higher... 
oh, all right.” (Gesture) What is this? Is it an expression of content?
Perhaps the most important thing in connection with aesthetics 
is what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g. discontent, disgust, 
discomfort.... The expression of discontent says: ‘Make it higher... 
too low!... do something to this.’ (Wittgenstein 1966, 13; see also 3)
Aesthetic taste is inevitably culturally shaped, and yet it often finds 
its most appropriate form of expression not in a propositional judg-
8 This aspect is perfectly in line with a ‘bottom-up’ enactivist account; see Moyal-
Sharrock 2013.
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ment – as one could think, given the alleged ‘high level’ cognition in-
volved – but in a normative gesture. Sometimes in the domain of aes-
thetics we are really unable to explain in words what we can express 
in gestures, facial expressions, and fine shades of behaviour (Witt-
genstein 1966, § 12).9
The understanding of works of art, for instance of a musical piece 
or a musical phrase, is also typically (though not exclusively) ex-
pressed in appropriate gestures and behaviour (Wittgenstein 1998, 
79).10 The reaction to a piece of music is immediate and it involves 
culture-specific competence. As Schulte (1993, 53) puts it, making 
the point more general:
Even our so-called “spontaneous” forms of reactions – certain 
kinds of gestures or dance steps when listening to music, excla-
mations like “Ouch” or “Help!” or more complicated forms of be-
havior in the case of pain – will acquire sense only within a lan-
guage game and hence through their connections with certain 
kinds of conduct and through being embedded in relevant prac-
tices. […] A new experience is not even an experience if the rele-
vant concepts are lacking, that is, if one has not learnt to make a 
number of moves in the language game in question. And if we do 
not know the techniques to be used in the language, there will be 
no spontaneous reactions to our experiences.
Spontaneity is cultural, and this is what a truly enactivist account of 
normativity should be able to describe. Aesthetic gestures are an ex-
ample of this spontaneous normativity: they are embodied, enactive, 
and they show that normativity is in everyday life (Frega 2015), rath-
er than being a set of rules that somewhat stay above our heads and 
that we sometimes consult, pick up and apply.
5 Pragmatist Cultural Enactivism
The notion of enacted normativity that emerges in investigating ges-
tures is especially interesting for pragmatist-inspired enactivism 
(Menary 2016; Madzia, Jung 2016; Gallagher 2017; Madzia, Santarelli 
9 This is also related to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘imponderable evidence’ (Wittgen-
stein 2009, part II, §§ 358-60); cf. Boncompagni 2018b.
10 For a comparison between language and music based on gesture see Oliva 2016. 
Wittgenstein also compares works of art themselves to gestures (on this see Milkov 
2020): “Architecture is a gesture – he claims for instance –. Not every purposive move-
ment of the human body is a gesture. Just as little as every functional building is archi-
tecture” (Wittgenstein 1998, 49): there is something in a gesture that exceeds purpo-
sive movement, it exceeds movement as a function of the organism.
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2017; Weichold 2017). As Gallagher, referring to Robert Brandom, has 
suggested: gestures have “socially instituted significance and nor-
mative status” (2017, 172), in that they are part of how we grasp oth-
er people’s intentionality (without the need of postulating internal 
states of mind) and of how we track other people’s behaviour (with-
out the need of explicit rules for that). Gestures indeed transcend 
their merely motor aspects and are both natural and conventional, 
precisely like language (Gallagher 2005, 122, 126).
Like Wittgenstein, the pragmatists point at the intertwinement 
of bodily/natural and sociocultural/normative aspects in the human 
form of life (but see Boncompagni forthcoming for differences). This 
is clear in the pragmatist notion of habit. From a pragmatist perspec-
tive, habit is essentially the result of ‘paths’ or ‘channels’ formed in 
the brain, but at the same time it is socially and culturally shaped, as 
the individual is a social and cultural being from the start. Gesture, 
in this sense, is revelatory of habits of acting and thinking.
Not coincidentally, one of the most relevant accounts of gestures 
in philosophy is due to the pragmatist thinker George Herbert Mead, 
who identified in gesture “the basic mechanism” of the social process:
Within any given social act, an adjustment is effected, by means 
of gestures, of the actions of one organism involved to the ac-
tions of another; the gestures are movements of the first organ-
ism which act as specific stimuli calling for the (socially) appro-
priate responses of the second organism. […] The specialization 
of the human animal within this field of the gesture has been re-
sponsible, ultimately, for the origin and growth of present human 
society and knowledge, with all the control over nature and on the 
human environment which science makes possible. (Mead [1963] 
2015, 13-14, fn. 9)
Against the idea of gesture as the expression of an already formed 
internal mental state, Mead claimed that consciousness itself emerg-
es from the mechanism of gestures, once a participant hears his/her 
own vocal gesture in an interaction and learns to react to it. There-
fore, the social act (the conversation of gestures) is a precondition of 
consciousness rather than the other way around (Mead [1963] 2015, 
17-18). While this idea of the development of consciousness sounds in 
line with the participatory sense-making approach, in earlier writ-
ings Mead also highlighted bodily attitudes, facial expressions and 
the tone of voice as affectively felt in the social exchange (Mead 1895, 
[1895] 2001). By taking into account the human embeddedness in a 
sociocultural environment, it is possible to envision here a perspec-
tive in which linguistic and broadly cultural and normative practices 
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reshape bodily and emotional gestures themselves.11 In other words, 
affective sensibility as a means of reciprocal regulation is reshaped 
by virtue of its belonging to a cultural and linguistic context from 
the start (Dreon 2019b).
This understanding of gestures and emotive responses as already 
normatively shaped is also coherent with Dewey’s cultural natural-
ism. Of the many aspects of Dewey’s approach, I would like to high-
light here one that strikes me as a pragmatist equivalent of the Witt-
gensteinian reflection on aesthetic reactions and aesthetic gestures, 
namely, his remarks on linguistic ejaculations and interjections. In 
his article “Qualitative Thought”, published in 1930, Dewey claimed 
that some expressions such as ‘Alas’, ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Oh!’ are not mere-
ly organic responses of the human being, but symbolize “an integrat-
ed attitude towards the quality of a situation as a whole” and “have 
an intellectual import” ([1930] 1984, 250). Moreover, he claimed, 
like Wittgenstein, that sometimes an aesthetic judgment concerning, 
for instance, the quality of a piece of acting on the stage, or a deed 
performed, or the “a picture with its wealth of content”, finds a bet-
ter expression in these symbols, or in an exclamation like “Good!” 
(something that Wittgenstein would say is just like a gesture), rath-
er than “in a long-winded disquisition” ([1930] 1984, 250). These ex-
pressions, for Dewey, are examples of qualitative thought, a wording 
that already manifests the interlacing of immediacy and normativity.
While they are primitive, it does not follow that [such ejaculato-
ry judgments] are always superficial and immature. Sometimes, 
indeed, they express an infantile mode of intellectual response. 
But they may also sum up and integrate prolonged previous expe-
rience and training, and bring to a unified head the results of se-
vere and consecutive reflection. ([1930] 1984, 250)
Attention to the qualitative is a constant element in Dewey’s thought 
(see for instance Dewey 1925). The passages just quoted show that 
for Dewey, in the human context, immediacy is permeated and struc-
tured by evaluative and normative strands. In this sense, it is precise-
ly the richness of human beings’ interactions with their environment 
that Dewey invites us to look at, contra reductionist accounts. This 
also means acknowledging the impact of culture and language on 
alleged basic aspects of cognition such as perception, motor action, 
and affective sensibility, seeing the human ecological niche as high-
ly social, culturally stratified, and linguistic. This suggests, again, 
that the separation between ‘low’ and ‘high’ cognition is itself prob-
lematic and misleading (Dreon 2019a).
11 On the normativity of emotions see Hufendiek 2017.
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6 Conclusion
The issue of normativity proves tricky for enactivist approaches. Ac-
counting for it in a naturalistic framework and at the same time avoid-
ing forms of reductionism is no easy task. Some versions of enactiv-
ism that project normativity upon a merely autopoietic and adaptive 
behaviour risk missing the point when they tend to misapply con-
cepts that are appropriate to the human domain onto basic forms of 
life, and/or suggest that normativity can be explained by reference 
to these basic behaviours. Other enactivist approaches focused on 
the human sociocultural environment seem more promising. An enac-
tivist account of normativity in the human context is indeed particu-
larly apt to capture the embodied and spontaneous nature of norma-
tive constraints in everyday activities and interactions, unveiling how 
separating ‘high’ and ‘low’ or basic cognition is actually a misleading 
move. Aesthetic gestures show this very clearly. These natural, spon-
taneous and at the same time deeply cultural and evaluative reac-
tions are examples of enacted normativity.12 Aesthetic gestures were 
examined here in the framework of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but it 
was also argued that pragmatism developed a similar understand-
ing, most notably with John Dewey’s concept of ‘qualitative thought’. 
To conclude: an enactivist inquiry into aesthetic gestures, supported 
by Wittgensteinian and pragmatist insights, could help characterize 
human cognition as intrinsically enactive and normative, exemplify-
ing an authentically non-reductionist perspective.13
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